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Abstract 
The financial and economic crisis of 2008 has highlighted the changing 
landscape of international relations and the enormous pressure on the 
People’s Republic of China to redefine its international position. Based on 
two case studies, China’s Africa policy and its response to the global financial 
and economic crisis, we argue that China’s foreign policies are currently 
characterized by an adaptation of its historical role conception as a “leading 
developing country” to that of a “responsible caretaker” in international, 
especially economic affairs. In its own perceptions – developed in constant 
exchange with external perceptions of China – as well as in its actions, the PRC 
finds itself drawn faster and further into a complex web of global governance 
than anticipated by its policy elites. Acknowledging the benefits of a stronger 
involvement, the PRC steps up its engagement with regional, multilateral and 
global orders and is actively pursuing their recalibration. Contradictions within 
the Chinese leadership, conflicting themes in public discourse and incoherent 
actions highlight the difficulties even for a technocratic one-party elite with 
a limited – albeit real and important – need to assure domestic support and 
legitimacy to define the global role of an “emerging great power”.
Keywords: China, foreign policy, China and Africa, China and G20, Global 
Financial Crisis
JEL classification: F5, F55, F59, G0
1. Introduction1
The financial and economic crisis that erupted in the United States in 2008 
has highlighted the changing landscape of international relations. The People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) found itself under enormous pressure to redefine 
its role in and contribution to global problem-solving. Earlier discussions on 
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whether to contain or to engage the emerging superpower in the west (Mills, 
1996; Shambaugh, 1996) gave way to analyses of how China’s rise would de-
termine the future international political system. More than three decades after 
the PRC embarked on its policies of economic growth, social change and the 
effective modernization of its one-party state, China has moved to the centre 
stage of the new global order (Breslin, 2007; Helleiner and Pagliari, 2010). 
On a superficial glance, these changes in external role expectations 
regarding the Chinese leadership resembles the realization of their long 
cherished ambition to lead erstwhile leading global civilization back to its 
former glory. However, on closer inspection, China’s leaders find the new 
situation rather difficult to deal with: the increased international prestige 
serves the Communist Party’s leadership credentials at home, yet it challenges 
the officially restrictive interpretation of national sovereignty. Domestic and 
foreign expectations hardly ever match. In this paper, we argue that these 
divergent role expectations increase the complexity of policy-making in 
Beijing at a time when the Chinese leadership and society still predominantly 
views itself as a developing country. 
On the international stage, the sometimes open, sometimes implicit nega-
tion of democratic norms and practices by the Chinese leadership reinforces 
views that a “Beijing Consensus” (Ramo, 2004) is undermining the current 
political, economic, social and cultural norms, values and institutions that 
support the US-led international economic, political and security order. The 
combination of “might, money, and minds” (Lampton, 2008) causes anxiety 
mixed with open hostility about the impact of China’s (re-)emergence on the 
existing global political economy (US Congress, 2008). Based on an analysis 
predominantly within the framework of a neo-realist, balance of power ori-
ented thinking, many observers in the United States and Europe tend to per-
ceive China’s rise as a challenge to an existing world order (Friedberg, 2005; 
Mitchell, 2009). Research by China-watchers provides a different perspective: 
a Communist party battling the effects of its reform policies, a party-state ripe 
with internal groups and factions in need of ongoing crisis-management and 
negotiations, muddling through on the basis of learning and adaptation.
The motivation behind actions of states is usually derived from interests 
and preferences or from external constraints. Following earlier works on the 
strategic-relational model in international relations (Brighi, 2007: 104-110), 
this paper argues that China’s foreign policies are currently characterized 
by an adaptation of its historical role conception as a “leading developing 
country” to that of a “responsible caretaker” in international, especially 
economic affairs as a result of domestic policies as well as a changing global 
environment. In its own perceptions – developed in constant exchange with 
external perceptions of China – as well as in its actions, the PRC finds itself 
drawn faster and further into a complex web of global governance than 
IJCS 2-1 combined text final 07-2   2 4/8/2011   12:34:48 AM
China’s Foreign Policies in a Changing Global Environment      
anticipated by its policy elites. Acknowledging the benefits of a stronger 
involvement, the PRC steps up its engagement with regional, multilateral and 
global orders and is actively pursuing their recalibration. Contradictions within 
the Chinese leadership, conflicting themes in public discourse and incoherent 
actions highlight the difficulties even for a technocratic one-party elite with 
a limited – albeit real and important – need to assure domestic support and 
legitimacy to define the global role of an “emerging great power” (for an 
earlier version of this argument see Gottwald and Duggan, 2011).
Our line of argument is based on two case studies: China’s Africa 
policy and its response to the global financial and economic crisis. In its 
Africa policy, the Chinese leadership had to broker ceasefires more than 
consensus among battling ministerial and super-ministerial bureaucracies 
at home while meeting increasing external pressure to change its formally 
non-interventionist no-conditions-attached approach in the face of US and 
European criticism. A change in its self-definition regarding its role in Africa 
as well as its cooperation with other powers can be identified. Preserving its 
clear priority for securing access to resources and building up influence, the 
Chinese leadership has gradually turned to implement less confrontational, 
more pro-activist policies.
In the global efforts to handle the financial and economic crisis, China 
had to give up its traditional role as a bystander to global cooperation. Rising 
domestic expectations regarding China’s new international significance 
particularly among the politically important young online generation, the 
Chinese leadership has to strike a balance between increased integration into 
global governance and preservation of its room for manoeuvre. After some 
considerations, China seemed to take a pro-active approach in 2009 before 
a stalemate at the G20 summits in Toronto and Seoul deflated high-flying 
expectations. China’s increased profile and growing influence in global 
economic governance is only gradually translating into a new order. The jury 
is still out whether or not China’s engagement will actually reinforce US- and 
EU-based notions of global governance or turn out to be one more cornerstone 
in establishing a new model for political and economic governance. The 
strong support shown for the G20 might result more from the non-binding 
unanimous decision-making in this club-style organization than from a new 
found acceptance of multilateral institution-building for global governance 
(Johnston, 2008).
2. China’s Rise as a Challenge to Political and Academic Analyses
When the CCP introduced reforms in the late 1970s, it began to infuse 
elements of a market economy into a socialist state by means of Leninist 
innovation (Heilmann, 2008). Its phenomenal economic development created 
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an urgent demand for energy (EIA, 2006) and raw materials. The export-
based growth model required access to foreign markets. The transformation 
of its centrally planned economy into a Socialist Market Economy resulted 
in a loss of control over various aspects of Chinese society (see Yeoh, 2010). 
Economic success and nationalism became the cornerstones of the CCP 
legitimacy which created strong societal expectations as to China’s rank and 
status in world politics. This transformation of societal expectations, however, 
intertwined the Party’s identity with China’s overall national identity, and 
economic success. Socialism was thus redefined as good policies to raise the 
living standards of the people and to facilitate China’s return to international 
“great power” status. 
This required a revision of China’s foreign policy guidelines. Zheng 
Bijian (2005) proposed to emphasize “China’s Peaceful Rise” (Glaser 
and Menderos, 2007; Deng and Wang, 2005; Chan, 2005). This was 
subsequently changed to “China’s Peaceful Development” (Luo, 2006) to 
avoid the supposedly aggressive connotations of the term “rise”. “Peaceful 
development” complements the new interest in Chinese “soft power” 
addressing global unease with China’s growing influence. Both concepts 
share the premise that good relations with China’s neighbours will enhance 
rather than diminish the comprehensive national power of the PRC (Zheng, 
2005). Both concepts resonate well with the long-standing tradition of 
imperial status-quo policies and the “five principles” (Wen, 2004) of “mutual 
respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-
interference in each others’ internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit, and 
peaceful coexistence” (Liu, 2003). 
All the official emphases on the peaceful nature of China’s new 
significance, however, are overshadowed by sensitive issues such as Sino-
Taiwanese (Chen, 2005; Henderson, 2006) or Sino-Japanese relations 
(Johnston, 2006). The cross-cutting role expectations of the resulting rise 
in nationalism (Hughes, 2006) are a constant threat to gains from Chain’s 
constantly growing participation in the East Asia’s regional economy (Liao, 
2006). The CCP needs economic growth which requires stable relations with 
important economic partners, turning China into a “fragile superpower” 
(Shirk, 2007). 
The complexity of the internal and external dynamics of China’s 
emergence is reflected in the diversity of theoretical approaches dealing 
with it. The majority of analyses recount the aims and calculations of China 
as a state or Beijing as a government, thus continuing the tradition of the 
rational actor model of analysis (Legro, 2008). It dovetails nicely with earlier 
historical approaches interpreting the PRC as an imperial reincarnation 
(Fairbanks, 1968; Osterhammel, 1989; Gelber, 2007). Stressing continuity, the 
“Middle Kingdom” resided on top of a hierarchical world and was the centre 
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of tributary regional relations, claiming the status of the most civilized and 
greatest power. After the intermezzo of quasi-colonial exploitation between 
1860 and 1949, its re-emergence constitutes a return to its traditional, one 
might argue “normal” position. Accordingly, China limits interactions with 
the rest of the world and defines terms and conditions. While the policies of 
opening-up and reform hardly fit into this perspective (Yuan, 2008), they still 
highlight the relevance of Chinese traditional values and norms in foreign 
policies. The leadership of the PRC often refers to history when explaining 
current policies (State Council, 2005). Chinese foreign policies thus become 
the blend of imperial history and orthodox Marxist-Leninist ideology (Liao, 
1986) defined by (the) top Chinese leader(s) (Ming, 2007). In both the 
historical and the communist view, the key factor for China’s foreign behavior 
is China itself. International forces come second. 
The contemporary debate is dominated by (neo-)realist interpretations 
of China negotiating an anarchic international environment (Callahan, 
2005; Goldstein, 2001; Wacker, 2006). Like all rising powers before, the 
PRC confronts the existing structure of international politics as part of 
its quest for survival (Morgenthau, 1985; Waltz, 1979). Most foreign and 
domestic media take a similar approach (Castle, 2008; Rozhnov, 2010). The 
neo-realist approach downplays the significance of domestic policies and 
expectations, a view taken by a growing number of China-watchers. Reaping 
massive benefits from the increased integration into the global economy (Gu, 
Humphrey and Meissner, 2008) the PRC participates in global governance 
and multilateralism to maintain that status quo (Chung, 2008; Contessi, 2009; 
Economy, 2005; Hughes, 2005; Johnston, 2003). All of these perspectives 
on China’s rise have a common feature: they treat China as a unitary actor, 
either influenced by its own tradition and communist ideology or by some 
rational calculation as if China were a single individual and able to assess its 
environment, make decisions, and react accordingly. As a result, a strategy 
based on China’s best interests is executed as foreign policies within a stable 
pre-set international environment. 
Contrary to the predominant neo-realist view, most domestic experts and 
students of policy-making in the PRC consider social and political stability 
as a prerequisite for further economic development the number one priority 
for the Chinese leadership. Thus, all Chinese foreign policy is addressing 
domestic expectations first.2 But domestic policies exhibit a growing number 
of conflicting interests within and around the CCP (Dreyer, 2010; Saich, 2005; 
Yang, 2005), thus questioning the concept of the PRC as a single unitary actor. 
Within the Chinese leadership and in the increasingly complex and pluralistic 
society, groups pursue particular interests, define specific preferences and 
create different power bases. Group interests in the field of foreign affairs 
can differ widely leading to sometimes incoherent, sometimes conflicting 
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policy outcomes. For actors pursuing their aims, structures and institutions 
matter (Breslin, 2006). The PRC’s global actions are thus shaped primarily 
by domestic political structures, secondary level institutions and negotiations 
between collective actors (Lampton, 2001, Lu, 2000). Different perceptions 
among Chinese elites affect international actions (Deng, 2008; Yan, 2001, 
2006) particularly on issues like Taiwanese independence as do social trends 
and issues (Buzan, 2010). 
Perceptual and institutional approaches look at China’s rise in very 
different ways but they share a very important aspect: they open up the black 
box of the Chinese state and bring in bureaucratic policies, intra-elite conflict 
and processes of political bargaining. They complement the state-centric view 
by bringing in state-controlled and non-state actors like enterprises, regulatory 
agencies or the nascent civil society. Thus, they link up with the growing 
literature on global politics as a result of trans-national activity (Helleiner 
and Pagliari, 2010). 
Following this approach, we interpret China’s role in this process of 
joining and redefining global politics as a result of actions by Chinese leaders 
and non-state actors reacting to domestic and external expectations pursuing 
individual interests and preferences. We conceptualize China’s position in 
global politics as a national role that is based on both domestic and external 
expectations regarding “appropriate behaviour”. This approach highlights the 
mutual interdependence between China’s policies towards the international 
order and the impact of the order on China’s policies. It enables us to integrate 
external perceptions of China by state- and non-state actors alike, addressing 
causal alleys for adaptation and learning. We open up the domestic dimension 
by referring to the expectations of the domestic audience and, finally, allow 
for ideas, notions of historical traditions and interests to be integrated through 
the self-perception of the Chinese leadership regarding its role. Our approach 
thus identifies early signs of change as a form of partial role adaption taking 
place within an increasingly challenging global environment defined by the 
potentially deepest political-and economic crisis since the early 20th century. 
Linking it to the field of foreign policy change it offers an integration of recent 
approaches to the study of China’s domestic policies discussed as learning or 
adaptive authoritarianism with current debates in the study of foreign and 
regional policies. 
2.1. China’s Changing Role in Africa the Balancing of Expectations
China has played a role in Africa since antiquity and was an actor of note 
during the cold war where its actions on the continent were heavily influenced 
by the ideology of socialist internationalism and anti-colonial struggle. 
Although its influence in Africa declined during the reform era of the 1980s, 
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it has rediscovered its interest in the continent since the turn of the century 
and has once again become a major actor in the region. China is now Africa’s 
second largest trading partner, a key supplier of development aid and a major 
source of FDI. A growing number of Chinese citizens have taken up residence 
in Africa. Summing up, in “the last sixty years, no country has made as big 
an impact on the political, economic and social fabric of Africa as China has 
since the turn of the millennium” (Moyo, 2009: 103).
China has become deeply involved with Africa both in terms of eco-
nomics and culture and encompassing state, semi-state and non-state actors 
(Raine, 2009: 60). The Chinese state has acknowledged this and launched 
a new China-Africa Policy in 2006 (Foreign Ministry of the PRC, 2006) 
accompanied by a number of remarkable China Africa Summits in 2000 
(Beijing), 2003 (Addis Ababa), 2006 (Beijing), and 2009 (Sharm el-Sheikh). 
The foreign perception of China’s role in Africa has frequently been 
negative, even referring to neo-colonialism. Sighting such actions as the 
unconditional provision of finance, selling of arms, or the protection of “rogue 
states” from international sanctions, many critique China for its negative 
impact on African society and economy. Some observers also accuse the 
PRC of instrumentalizing its traditional emphasis on sovereignty and non-
interference to carve out economic deals (Holslag, 2006).
From an African perspective, China’s involvement is regarded a mixed 
blessing. The PRC seems to use Africa as a resource both in terms of raw 
materials and international influence. From this point of view, China has 
damaged many of the rights won through independence e.g. workers right, 
free press, etc. Here, China has simply replaced the old colonial powers in 
spite of its claims to be a leader of the developing world, with Sudan being 
a prominent case in point (Srinivasan, 2008). A different view depicts China 
as an alternative source for investment and aid to western powers. It has 
also delivered on needed infrastructure projects which delivered significant 
improvements to the lives of many people in Africa. 
Within China itself, the principal view held describes the PRC as Africa’s 
“All Weather Friend”, whose presence creates a win-win situation for both 
(Xu, 2008). From this perspective, China’s role is defined by a number of 
key principles outlined in the 2006 White Paper, most notably the respect of 
state sovereignty (cf. Zheng, 2010: 42-45). Due to the complex relationship 
between state and society in African nations, local elites emphasize the 
principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states by 
external actors, too (Taylor, 2010). For many African states who have found 
the restructuring programmes under the Washington Consensus very difficult 
and for governments who have been marginalized by Western criticism 
of their human rights records, the PRC’s interpretation of sovereignty is 
particularly attractive. Along with a shared experience of colonialism and 
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imperial oppression, China provides an alternative role model and new 
legitimacy for African autocratic polities (Sicular et al., 2007). 
In contrast to this official definition, many Chinese observers take a less 
favourable approach. They insist that large foreign aid projects need to benefit 
the Chinese economy, since these funds could have been used domestically for 
internal poverty relief. For this reason, development projects must create “win-
win” situations in substance and not only in rhetoric. Consequently, Chinese 
involvement in Guinea decreased in line with the fall of prices for copper 
and other raw materials highlighting the need for its external involvement 
not to produce costs at home (Polgreen, 2009). The Chinese government is 
pressed to publicly protect its interests abroad, including interventions in the 
domestic affairs of sovereign African states. So-called “soft” interventions 
were employed on several occasions to protect Chinese MNCs in Africa. In 
Namibia, the PRC government pushed for the release of a CEO who had been 
charged with corruption (Grobler, 2010). In Zambia, it threatened to pull out 
its investment should a candidate, Michael Sata, who was accused of anti-
Chinese policies, win the presidential elections (BBC, 2006).
In the case of Chinese involvement in Sudan, Beijing substantially 
altered its role behavior over the course of the humanitarian crisis in Darfur. 
The PRC started with an obstructionist role in the Security Council, but 
eventually dispatched peacekeeping forces under a UN Security Council 
mandate (Huang, 2008). This policy shift indicated a delicate balance of 
two conflicting expectations, namely external role expectations on the one 
hand and the Chinese concept of “peaceful development” on the other hand. 
China’s Africa policy had been based originally on the earlier model as a 
“leading developing country”. On this basis, China in 2004 effectively diluted 
Washington’s sanctions policy in the UN Security Council (UNSC). In January 
2005, the PRC began to modify its policy due to the “Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement” and under heavy criticism from non-governmental groups and 
the Bush administration. China’s abstention on Res. 1593 – which allowed 
for ICC investigations in Darfur – signaled for the first time that China 
would not always align with the Sudanese leadership and the Arab League on 
Darfur. Instead, and despite the establishment of the “China-Arab Cooperation 
Forum” the preceding year, Beijing even supported UNSC Res. 1679, which 
strengthened the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), and justified its 
vote “on the basis of our political support for the AU” (UN-Doc. S/PV.5439, 
16.5.06). While Beijing hesitated to embrace the AU position on Darfur, China 
launched a “Darfur initiative”, appointing a Special Representative, pressuring 
the Bashir government and offering 275 engineers in support of the hybrid 
AU/UN mission (Evans and Steinberg, 2007). 
Daniel Large suggested that China’s Africa policy shifted to such an 
extent that it has led other actors to reconsider their conduct (Large, 2008: 
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74). First, the intervention by the Chinese President Hu Jintao appeared to 
have been instrumental in persuading the Sudanese leadership to take on a 
more constructive role towards the AU/UN mission. Second, the Chinese 
abandonment of its obstructionist policy in the Security Council arguably 
added pressure on Arab regimes to moderate their support for Khartoum. 
Right after China’s policy shift 10 Arabian states decided to provide 
substantial funding for the AMIS operation. The Arab League itself persuaded 
the Sudanese government to accept the AU/UN force at the AL Summit in 
March 2007. Subsequently, Qatar, a key member of the AL, voted in favour 
of UNSC Res. 1769 which mandated the AU/UN mission in Darfur.
Other factors in the context of Sino-Sudanese relations also had their 
impact. The growing restlessness of the Southern Sudanese Government 
contributed to China’s policy shift. The proposed referendum on independence 
in Southern Sudan in January 2011 might create a new independent state 
controlling the vast majority of Sudan’s oil reserves (Srinivasan, 2008). Many 
believe that the growing Chinese engagement in Juba is therefore motivated by 
two factors: one, to address its acknowledged unpopularity and, two, to gain a 
more strategic political foothold in the South (Large, 2009). The contribution 
of the PRC to persuading Khartoum to accept the AU/UN Mission can thus 
be interpreted as an attempt to present itself to the future government of an 
oil rich South Sudan as a positive influence in the region.
This brief analysis of China’s Sudan policy shows that a host of factors 
have contributed to how a country conducts its affairs on the international 
stage. We can see a shift from a broadly ego-based to a more comprehensive 
national role conception combining both ego- and alter-expectations. 
Increasing international pressure moved Africa higher up the policy agenda 
of the central leadership which beforehand had left much of its Africa policies 
to the various ministries and bureaucratic units. Positions and conduct were 
modified to meet the expectation of others, most notably the African Union. 
Moreover, China’s increasingly active position in Africa – veto suspension, 
appointment of a Special Representative, dispatching peacekeepers – suggests 
the position has become “firmer” over time and will probably stabilize if 
counter-roles by significant others (the US, AU, AL) evolve accordingly. 
The increase in Sino-African trade as well as in other economic 
activities has created a more complex relationship. The number of influences 
which affect how China conducts its activities in Africa has grown, with 
particular influences becoming more important than others. For example, the 
international pressure on the PRC to become a more proactive member of 
the global community, a ‘responsible stakeholder’ in the promotion of global 
standards and ethics, is now more influential than the domestic pressure to 
maintain China’s role as an anti-establishment actor which still seems to bear a 
significant influence on the PRC North Korea policies. The Chinese leadership 
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even qualified its adherence to the core principle of non-interference: 
President Hu Jintao has pointed out that China is now willing to intervene 
in other nations’ internal affairs to protect its national interests, hinting at 
an incipient departure from the soft interventionism of the recent past. This 
move addresses domestic pressure to better protect Chinese interests abroad. 
At the same time, China has also shown a growing willingness to engage in 
international conflict-settlement. Its participation in peacekeeping missions 
indicates the growing awareness of external expectations and willingness to 
fulfill them – at least as long as they can be sold to its domestic audience as 
beneficial for China’s long-term socioeconomic development. 
3. Reluctant Crisis-Manager: China’s New Role as a Stabilizer/Initiator
  of Global Financial Governance 
The interplay of external and domestic expectations with the self-perceptions 
and preferences of the Chinese leadership became almost irritatingly obvious 
during the current financial crisis. The insolvency of the American investment 
bank Lehman Brothers in September 2008 triggered a chain-reaction of 
global financial turmoil. Governments all over the world struggled to prevent 
a melt-down of their financial systems. Most ended up with majority stakes 
in one or all of their former national champions. Greece and Ireland needed 
the support of the IMF and the EU to avoid a sovereign debt default. In 
Asia, Japan struggled to refinance its debt while in the US the Fed embarked 
on several rounds of quantitative easing fuelling fears of new speculative 
bubbles in emerging economies. Most governments agreed that the crisis 
required a well-coordinated global response. The leadership of the PRC 
found itself drawn deeper into the efforts of global crisis management than it 
had envisaged. A new and very substantial role emerged for the PRC and its 
hesitant government (Godement, 2009: 19).
In the perspective of comparative government, the PRC has been aptly 
described as a learning, adaptive authoritarian system, with the state dominated 
by the Leninist party apparatus (Shambaugh, 2008; Naughton, 2008; Niquet, 
2009). Learning from its own history, from Western market economies and 
from the results of extensive experiments, the CCP has managed to strengthen 
its grip on the Chinese polity while at the same time introducing fundamental 
economic and social reforms (Brodsgaard and Zheng, 2006; Heilmann, 2008; 
Pearson, 2001; Zheng, 2010). The global crisis erupting in 2008 threatened 
the cornerstone of China’s export and FDI oriented development. This has put 
the capabilities for adaptation of the Chinese polity to a severe test as there 
was no “best international practice” in dealing with this unprecedented event. 
And time was too short to conduct the usual set of trial-and-error policies. 
Besides, the crisis challenged and threatened China’s preferred role as a 
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benevolent bystander and generally non-committal supporter of multilateral 
global governance. It took the central leadership in Beijing some time to agree 
on a political reaction. They had to recognize that the “globalization of the 
crisis requires a globalized response” (Bergsten, 2008) even if it included a 
revision of China’s traditional role in international relations. 
3.1. China’s Initial Reaction: Defending Its Role as Benevolent Bystander
China’s economy was in particular good shape when the crisis hit (Sheng, 
2010). Banking and financial services were government-controlled, partly 
state-owned and had only limited exposed to global turbulence. The balance 
sheets of the main banks are regularly propped up by the state coffers3 and 
its securities markets offer only limited access to foreign investors while 
Chinese savers still face hurdles if they wish to keep their deposits outside the 
Chinese system (Zeihan, 2010). Some of the riskiest instruments were banned 
inside China. Overall, Chinese banks managed to escape the financial crisis 
with relatively low losses. Foreign exchange controls, vast foreign exchange 
reserves and an emerging consumer culture offered strong options for macro-
economic countermeasures against the fall-out from the crisis.4 Finally, the 
Chinese leaders had gained a reputation for its high-quality policy-making and 
were safe from electoral pressures. From a Chinese perspective, the financial 
crisis met an economy which was well-prepared to turn the challenge into an 
advantage (Sun, 2009).
For all these reasons China initially took its responsible bystander 
position when first signs of a financial crisis merged in the US in the first 
half of 2008. The original impression was that the events were an issue for 
Western capitalism (Warden and Stanway, 2008). Chinese leaders reassured 
their domestic audience of the strength of their own economy. Even after 
the global public discussed the events as an economic crisis, Chinese 
newspapers and magazines kept the official description as a Western financial 
crisis (Zheng, 2008). Only the official investments in US and European 
financial service companies and in US bonds raised public anger. The 
situation changed when Chinese exports started to dive. Acknowledging 
the fundamental threat of the crisis to its export-led growth model, the 
Chinese leadership finally accepted the need for political action. In a two-
tier approach the CCP created a macro-economic stimulus package for the 
domestic economy and took a more pro-active approach towards reforming 
global governance for financial services.
Up to the crisis, China has been a rule-taker much more than a rule-
maker in the area of financial services. This role dovetailed nicely with 
China’s traditional approach to global governance best described as 
that of ‘a benevolent bystander’ to global governance who would adopt 
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international norms and standards à la carte (Walter, 2010). In global trade, 
it was exactly the wish to become part of the rule-makers which pushed the 
Chinese leadership to achieve membership of the WTO even in the face of 
substantial domestic opposition (Fewsmith, 1999; Fischer, 2000). China’s 
active participation in the Cancun conference on World Trade, its key support 
to the multilateral attempt of dealing with North Korea’s nuclear weapons 
programme, China’s support for the Chiang Mai Initiative or the founding of 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization signalled a more positive perception of 
multilateralism among the Chinese leadership (Wu and Landsdowne, 2007). 
Initially, the Chinese leadership voiced their support for global co-
ordination, but refused to become too engaged (Wang, 2008; Zheng, 2008). 
Only after intensive domestic debate, and bowing to growing external 
pressure, the government in a first revision of its initial positions announced a 
4 trillion renminbi yuan package to boost its domestic demand on Sunday, 9th 
November 2008 (Xinhua, 2008). The announcement addressed both audiences: 
the domestic one by reassuring them of government action against the fall-out 
from dwindling exports, and the foreign one by stressing the willingness of the 
Chinese leadership to preserve China as a centre for global economic activity 
(Niquet, 2009). At the same time, the central government loosened constraints 
on local government investments (Wu, 2010) and ordered the state-controlled 
banks to facilitate cheap credits (Anderlini and Hughes, 2010; Cavey, 2009; 
Chan and Chu, 2009). The international reaction was euphoric (Branigan, 
2008). Only a few observers raised their concern, pointing at the paucity of 
information provided on the planned use of the funds. Some asked how much 
of the package constituted additional spending and how much of it was just 
a repackaging of already measures which had been planned and budgeted 
beforehand. China also refused steps to address what many perceived as a 
gross imbalance of the exchange rate between the managed RMB yuan and 
the fully convertible US dollar, referring only to the need to tackle global 
macro-economic issues. It stressed its reluctance to decrease the control of its 
currency when it announced an increase in exchange rate flexibility shortly 
before the Toronto summit but then had its large commercial banks buy US 
dollars in order to limit the appreciation of the renminbi. 
The Chinese leadership attempted to declare the stimulus package the 
key element of China’s contribution to the global crisis response. Leading 
cadres like Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao reiterated that the measures would keep 
China growing and that a growing China provided a substantial resource for 
the more advanced economies in their attempts of reigning in the economic 
downturn (Xinhua, 2009a). The main points of reference and the by far most 
important partners for the PRC to develop and to revise their position in the 
global fight against the fall-out from the financial crisis were the United States 
and the European Union (Gottwald, 2010).
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At the ASEM Summit in Beijing, China and the EU hammered out a 
joint position for the G20 Summit in Washington in November 2008. Prime 
Minister Wen Jiabao announced his support for the EU position on regulating 
global financial markets, highlighting a growing convergence between the two 
economic superpowers. From an internal perspective, Hu Jintao’s speech in 
Washington defined the official approach of the PRC towards future regulation 
(FMPRC, 2008). On Wen Jiabao’s visit to Europe in January 2009 and during 
the preparatory meeting of the G20 Ministers of Finance and Governors of 
Central Banks, China sought actively to coordinate its position with the US 
and Europe. 
The Group of 20 leading industrial and developing countries, the G20, 
quickly superseded the old G8 to become the focal point for global crisis 
management.5 As they reached beyond that contested exclusive club, the 
G20 became “de facto … the main global grouping of countries that is 
driving responses to the crisis”. (Prasad and Sorkin, 2009) A China that “was 
very cautious about joining any multilateral or regional arrangements” (Yu, 
2005: 5) to avoid any limitation of its sovereignty was proud to be a leading 
member of the G20 but kept a sceptical attitude towards committing to 
multilateralism.
3.2. China Reluctantly Adapting Its Role in the G20
For China’s role in global crisis management, the London Summit in 2009 
became a turning point. The United States, the EU and fellow emerging 
markets all explicitly called on the Chinese government to take a leading 
role beyond the stimulus package and “responsible investment” by joining 
the work of rewriting global governance rules for financial markets. This 
led to an increased debate in China about its dawning dominance in the new 
world order.6
Deciding on the best policy in these circumstances, however, proved 
difficult and complex. In theory, the centralized structure of the Chinese 
one-party-state allows for coordinated decision-making. China’s position for 
the G20 was decided at the highest level of the CCPCC Political Buro. The 
preparatory documents were prepared under crucial involvement of the political 
strategy research department of the CCPCC.7 At a meeting of 50 economists, 
the acting vice-head of the political strategy research department, Zheng Xinli, 
confirmed the official view that China’s integration into the global economy, 
including global governance institutions like the WTO, was following the 
internal imperative of domestic reform and opening up. In this regard, the 
financial crisis was expected to further strengthen China’s reform policies.8
Vice-Prime Minister Wang Qishan, the leading executive in the State 
Council in financial affairs, and even more so the finance ministry were 
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initially sidelined.9 Positioning China for the meeting of the finance ministers 
in London in March 2009, Wang stressed that keeping China’s economy on 
a sustainable growth course would constitute a major contribution to global 
crisis management. Implicitly quoting Hu Jintao’s remarks at the Washington 
Summit, he again underlined China’s willingness to join hands with the 
global community to contain the effects of the downturn (Wang, 2009a). 
He added that China was now ready to take a more active role within the 
IMF under the implicit condition of a clear timetable for IMF reform to the 
benefit of emerging market member states (Wang, 2009b). China raised its 
profile within the Bretton Woods institutions by delegating and promoting 
highly-qualified experts. While this is a strong indicator about the growing 
importance of the IMF for Chinese policies, the exact reform plans are still 
under discussion. Even the official denunciation of a G2 global order is 
qualified by open expressions of disappointment regarding the European role 
which is predominantly perceived as weak and incoherent. The loose structure 
and non-binding nature of the G20 help to avoid a premature definition of 
Chinese positions.
For the Chinese foreign ministry, global crisis management was de-
clared number one priority for the 2009. It called for a better structured 
and fairer global financial order.10 Together with Brazil, Russia and India it 
requested a stronger representation of the BRIC countries in the emerging 
new governance of global financial markets (Mo, 2009). The top candidate 
for the future secretary-general of the CCP, Xi Jinping, was sent out on a 
tour to Latin America and Malta that was described in the official Chinese 
media as a major contribution to defining the Chinese position regarding 
the global crisis, the limited role of its host countries in the world economy 
notwithstanding.11 When Wen Jiaobao expressed his dissatisfaction with the 
American safeguards for PRC investment in treasury bonds, he triggered 
a global discussion and a quick response by the Obama administration. In 
various meetings and phone calls, the new US government promised to protect 
China’s interests.12 According to Hong Kong media, Wen needed to assuage 
his domestic constituency who became is increasingly irritated with the high 
exposure of the PRC to American bonds. Even the top central leadership was 
supposedly shocked when it was informed about the investments taken by 
the Chinese state vehicles in US financial institutions.13 On the other hand, 
top-down Chinese analysts emphasize the opportunities the crisis offers to 
improve Chinese investments abroad (Zheng, 2009).14 In the run-up to the 
London summit, the central bank stirred up confusion among observers with 
its call for a replacement of the US dollar as the global lead currency through 
a reform of the IMF special drawing rights, a little known instrument.
With the London Summit in April 2009, the G20 clearly took over 
the key role in coordinating the global response and in reforms of global 
IJCS 2-1 combined text final 07-14   14 4/8/2011   12:34:48 AM
China’s Foreign Policies in a Changing Global Environment      5
financial governance. It defined steps towards a comprehensive reform of 
principles and organization guiding the IMF and World Bank, something 
China had called for long before the crisis. The push by the UK government 
to set up the G20 as a leading organization, calling the IMF a supporting 
infrastructure (Norman, 2010) further corresponded with traditional Chinese 
preferences regarding sovereignty and supranational commitments. The 
PRC duly strengthened its involvement. The G20 offers the Chinese 
government its preferred mechanism for decision-making (Garrett, 2010): 
unanimity, thus providing a de facto veto-power against any measure deemed 
unacceptable. Committing to a club, rather than to a multilateral organization 
with supranational elements, allows the leadership to preserve considerable 
autonomy within the G20 while at the same time selling its new, higher profile 
to its domestic audience as a symbol of strength and to the international 
audience as enhanced responsibility. 
This policy was reflected both in China’s preparations for the G20 summit 
in Pittsburgh and for Toronto in 2010. In Pittsburgh, Hu Jintao reiterated 
three main issues: the G20 should continue to coordinate macro-economic 
stimulus to secure sustainable economic growth, to implement the reform 
package for global financial regulation agreed at the London summit, and 
it should also address imbalances in the global economy rooted in the wide 
gap in development between the North and the South (FMPRC, 2009a). His 
final point again deflected criticism of China’s state-managed exchange rate 
considered to be one of the causes for the crisis by Western observers. Hu 
stressed the significance of China’s domestic policies and reiterated China’s 
substantial contribution to the global response in spite of its severe domestic 
challenges. The official English language report did not refer to multilateralism 
or China’s increased role in setting the rules for global governance (FMPRC, 
2009b),15 but the stronger representation within IMF and World Bank and the 
enhanced influence on the future of global governance for the emerging states 
was hailed as the major success even as the details of the reform still need 
further consideration (Xinhua, 2009).
At the G20 meeting of finance ministers and central bank governors 
before the Pittsburgh summit, the Chinese delegation provoked criticism at 
home and by foreign media for its refusal to hold press briefings. Instead, 
key statements were disseminated via official Xinhua news bulletins, very 
much to the dislike of foreign and Chinese media (Poon, 2009; Zhang, 
2009). However, Chinese delegations held press meetings when Hu Jintao 
participated in meetings. This indicates the strict limits for the ministry of 
finance and the central bank to produce statement on key economic policy 
issues; those are reserved to the top echelon of the party state. At the same 
event, the BRIC countries did not follow their tradition of holding a separate 
meeting of finance ministers leading to a joint communiqué. Instead, only 
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vice-ministers of finance came together without an official document being 
produced. This was interpreted as a sign that the rather effective cooperation 
among the most important emerging economies during the crisis was 
beginning to fade away (Poon, 2009). China’s attempt to position itself as a 
leading representative of emerging and developing countries suffered from 
its reluctance to discuss exchange rates which the leadership only changed 
shortly before the Toronto summit. 
After the Pittsburgh summit, optimistic foreign expectations of China’s 
commitment were disappointed. The willingness of the PRC leadership to 
cooperate was publicly called into question. The IMF complained that a 
progress report on national stimulus packages was blocked by China. Five 
heads of government took the unusual step to address the members of the 
G20 in a joint letter containing hardly disguised criticism of China’s vanishing 
enthusiasm for the G20 and its reluctance to honour its commitments (Giles 
and Beattie, 2010). 
In Toronto, the official Chinese position comprised four proposals: first, 
that the summit would send out a loud and clear signal to keep the global 
economy on track for recovery; second, that the summit would come to a 
shared understanding regarding the reform of global financial governance, 
strengthening the representation of emerging markets and developing 
countries; third, to enhance support for the least developed countries; and 
finally, to come up with a substantial push for the global trade talks to prevent 
a return to more protectionist trade policies (Zheng, 2009). Strengthening 
the voice of developing countries in the Bretton Woods organizations 
was explicitly called one of China’s own objectives for the work of the 
G20. In addition, the BRIC countries including China called for a fairer 
representation at the highest level of management in IMF and World Bank. 
The summit itself, however, was dominated by the rift between US and 
European governments on the phasing-out of loose fiscal policies to sustain 
economic recovery. In sharp contrast to earlier events, the Chinese position 
and statements from Chinese leaders hardly figured in international press 
reports after the summit. 
A rapidly inflating property bubble and growing social disparities at home 
reduced the resources the Chinese leadership had at its disposal for global 
cooperation. The G20 seem to have dropped down the list of priorities of 
the central leadership. The government of the PRC is caught between a rock 
and a hard place: a domestic audience expecting tough actions on social and 
economic development, including the maximum use of national resources 
for the development of China’s economy on the one side, and increasingly 
critical American and European audiences pushing for China to tackle issues 
of market openness, the exchange rate and adherence to international norms 
and standards. 
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4. Conclusion
China’s national role conception includes, as we have shown, elements of 
both cooperation and conflict with key international actors. To the extent 
that China’s domestic development and thus the security of the CCP regime 
is concerned, Beijing’s role taking is a function of expectations by a host of 
different and diverging domestic political actors, both within the government 
and beyond. This results in a balancing act in China’s foreign policy between 
internal and external forces. This often results in contradicting action by the 
PRC as polices are adopted to meet these factors. China is in the process of 
adapting its internal policies to external standards while at the same time 
pursuing strategies to set new global standards close to its domestic ones.
In its Africa policies, China finds itself in transition between presenting 
itself as guardian of the developing/third/non-aligned world and becoming 
a leading member of the club of the most powerful nations. Its power base, 
however, still lies with the developing and newly emerging world, particularly 
with the other BRIC countries. China has moved towards meeting some 
international norms and standards, particularly in the run-up to the Beijing 
Olympics. This in itself, however, is not necessarily a positive development 
as it has brought about increasingly open and proactive interventions in other 
nations’ domestic affairs. When protecting the interests of state-owned and 
state-controlled enterprises, the PRC often fails to live up to its rhetorical 
commitments on sovereignty. 
China’s response to the Global Financial Crisis highlights the difficulties 
for the leadership to deal with its strong involvement in the US economy 
while at the same time rejecting notions of becoming one half of a G2. A 
young urban population calls increasingly for a policy of using Chinese 
resources for the benefit of the PRC and for counteracting a perceived US 
supremacy. US and European governments, however, pressure and lobby 
the Chinese leadership to take on a more cooperative and pro-active role in 
global governance. While China’s government clearly sees the advantages 
of increasing its influence on the reform of global financial markets, it has 
benefited enormously from the “old” US-backed form of globalization. 
Defining a coherent strategy of reshaping the global order in finance seems to 
be beyond Beijing’s resources at the moment. Its policy so far rather follows 
the traditional step-by-step learning-by-doing approach which has been 
implemented so successfully in domestic reforms over the last three decades. 
Most of the public and considerable parts of the academic debate on 
China’s role in global policies turn around the impact of its rise on the existing 
world order. Most China watchers would be cautious to project past successes 
in socioeconomic modernization into the foreseeable future. In the realm 
of international relations, however, the question only too often seems to be 
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when China will be the next superpower, rather than whether it will manage 
to obtain this status. A world ruled by China (Jacques, 2010) is perceived as 
an explicit departure from Western norms, standards and experience. Using a 
role model approach provides a different picture. The unitary state PRC with 
its CCP leadership finds it increasingly difficult to navigate between external 
and domestic expectations. Demands from domestic audiences quite often do 
not fit over-optimistic foreign expectations and challenge the decision-making 
and diplomatic stamina of the Chinese leadership. 
In the reform of the global governance of financial markets, the Chinese 
leadership had to revise its position on several occasions: from flatly referring 
the crisis to Europe and the US first via creating its own huge stimulus 
package to rhetorically taking a lead in the reform of IMF and World Bank 
(while committing only limited financial resources), to significantly tuning 
down again its cooperative stance after the Pittsburgh summit. While the 
domestic audience may welcome China’s higher profile as a sign of return to 
superpower status and of the decline of the US, the property bubble, the debt 
burden of local authorities and growing social imbalances all lead to calls 
from the domestic audience for a clear focus on China’s economy rather than 
on the reform of global governance. A Chinese specialist put it bluntly: “We 
do not have the time to care much about G20. Our domestic problems are too 
demanding.”16 An attempt to balance these conflicting sets of expectations is 
becoming increasingly difficult for the Chinese leadership. Yet the traditional 
priority to put domestic issues first has not changed.
Looking ahead, the difficulties to create and execute a coherent set of 
policies to tackle the challenges of its increasing integration in the global 
economy, society and polity will grow further. China’s CCP increasingly 
encompasses conflicting social interests and political tendencies. In the run-
up to the next National Party Congress in 2012, at least two main groupings 
have been identified so far, and competing efforts of party leaders to position 
themselves for future leadership posts have already had an impact on key 
policy issues. No matter how these personnel and policy issues are going to 
be resolved, the co-existence of divergent interests within the leadership is 
going to add further complexity to the challenge of revising China’s role in 
global affairs.
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2.   Interviews in Beijing and Shanghai, 2009; in Beijing, 2010.
3.   In February 2009, the government announced plans to transfer US$30 billion to 
the Agricultural Bank of China. See Ftd online, “China päppelt Bauernbank mit 
Milliarden” <http://www.ftd.de/politik/international/:Neues-Konjunkturpaket-
China-p%Eppelt-Bauernbank-mit-Milliarden/.html> [10th February 
2009]. According to The Economist, from 1998 to 2005, China has propped up 
the balance sheets of its major banks by US$260 billion. 
4.   These assets are mostly US-dollar denominated thereby creating, the so-called 
“dollar-trap”, because their value will most likely diminish as the US has to face 
its growing public deficit.
5.   The G20 originated as “an informal forum intended to promote dialog between 
the industrialized and the developing countries with the aim of global economic 
stability. Annual meetings of their finance ministers and central bank governors 
had started in 1999 with their deputies meeting twice annually. Members of 
the G-20 are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, the European Union, 
France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi 
Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States” (Fues, 
2007: 14; see also Bergsten, 2004).
6.   See for example “China Bids for Yuan to Trump US Dollar”, in Caijing, 28th 
November 2008.
7.   See “Zhongguo Zhongyang Zuzhi Tu” <http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/2/ 
/2.html> [20th March 2009].
8.   See “Zhonggong Zhongyang Zhengce Yanjiushi Fuzhuren Zheng Xinli Yanjiang” 
<http://finance.sina.com.cn/hy/200902/95559.shtml> [20th March 
2009).
9.   Interview with Chinese analysts, 19th March 2009.
10.  Said Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi at a press conference in Beijing on 7th March 
2009. See “Zhongyang Zhengfu Menhu Wangzhan” <http://www.gov.cn/2009lh/
content_2520.htm> [10th March 2009].
11.  “Vice FM: Chinese VP’s Visit Boosts Consensus, Friendship, Co-op”, 24th 
February 2009 <http://www.gov.cn/misc/2009-02/2/content_202.htm>.
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12.  According to some experts in China, pressure from Beijing supposedly contrib-
uted to the decision to give a state guarantee for the biggest provider of mortgages 
in the US. Interviews in Beijing and Shanghai, May/June 2009.
13.  See “Wen Jiabao yu Hanhua Shengdun” <http://cn.chinareviewnews.com/crn-
webapp/search/allDetail.jsp?id=00990&sw=20%E5%9B%BD%E9%9B%
%E5%9B%A2> [20th March 2009].
14.  See f.e. Zheng Xinli as quoted in sohu.com <http://news.sohu.com/2009005/
n2209.shtml> [20th March 2009].
15.  The full text in Chinese is available at <http://www.cnr.cn/09zth/hjtcxlhgxlfh/
xinbaodao/200909/t2009092_50592.html> [12th April 2010].
16.  Interview at the Development Research Centre, Beijing, May 2010.
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